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Abstract
This introduction to Luciano Floridi’s philosophy of information (PI) 
provides a short overview of Floridi’s work and its reception by the 
library and information studies (LIS) community, brief definitions 
of some important PI concepts, and illustrations of Floridi’s three 
suggested applications of PI to library and information studies. It sug-
gests that LIS may just be as important to PI as PI is to LIS in terms 
of deepening our mutual understanding of information ontologies, 
the dynamics of informational domains, and the variety of evolving 
relationships among information organisms and information objects. 
Introduction
As the “library of the future” invents and reinvents itself over time, its 
collection also rearranges itself according to our changing notions of rel-
evance. For instance, back in 1995, a year that saw such technologically 
important events as the release of DEC’s AltaVista search engine, Micro-
soft’s Windows 95 operating system, and Netscape’s Navigator browser, as 
well as the release of such provocatively topical book titles as Life on the 
Screen (Turkle, 1995) and Future Libraries (Crawford & Gorman, 1995), it is 
hardly surprising that a short piece by an academic philosopher, based on 
an invited talk at a distant meeting, would have gone largely unnoticed by 
the library and information studies (LIS) community.
In fact, this particular piece by Oxford University’s Luciano Floridi, 
based on his remarks on “What We Do Not Know” at the fiftieth-anniversary 
conference in Paris commemorating the founding of UNESCO, did not 
appear especially striking in the context of the times and seems even less 
startling today:
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Not only has the Internet already enlarged our notion of illiteracy, 
and produced new forms of cultural isolation and discrimination, but, 
because it intensifies and amplifies the effects of the digital revolution, 
the Internet is also transforming some of our most radical conceptions 
and habits. Take our conception of a text, for example. The enormous 
importance of the new model of “spineless textuality” represented by 
the hypertext, the virtual ubiquity of documents, the appearance of 
online services and electronic sources that need to be catalogued, have 
all changed a discipline like librarianship in the most radical way. Even 
the library itself may disappear, as we move from the holding and lend-
ing library, which stores knowledge physically recorded on paper, to 
the consulting library, which provides access to electronic information 
on the network; then from an object-oriented culture, which produces 
multiple copies of physical entities like books and CD-ROMs for each 
user, to a culture that appreciates the relationship between time and 
information, and provides services charged per period of use; and fi-
nally from the library as a building to the library as a gate node in the 
virtual space of the digital encyclopedia. (1995a, p. 264)
The quotation also seems quite consistent with contemporary calls 
within LIS that year “to shift, first thought, then discourse, then research, 
by initiating a questioning of assumptions and purposes” in a search for 
new epistemological foundations (Budd, 1995, p. 315), and to give “much 
thought to meaningfully translating our values into an electronic infor-
mation context” (Buschman, 1995, p. 213). What is notable about this 
particular piece is that it can be said to represent the popular point of ori-
gin for the combination of Floridi’s previous work in the historical foun-
dations of epistemology (1993, 1994, 1995b), especially the importance 
of the “encyclopedia” in the emergence of human knowledge (1996), 
with his coming exploration of the impact of the internet on metaphysical 
speculation itself (2002c), culminating in the development of his putative 
“philosophy of information” (PI).
 Although certainly not the first to explore the impact of information- 
and computing-technology advances on philosophy and vice versa (for 
example, Agre, 1997; Crane, 1996; Heim, 1993; Pepperell, 1995), Floridi’s 
work (1999b) has gone beyond much of the early “computational turn” 
in philosophy (for example, Bynum & Moor, 1998) with his formulation 
of a philosophy done informationally (Greco, Paronitti, Turilli, & Flori-
di, 2005) and offering a formal analytic approach that can be employed 
metatheoretically in various domains (Floridi, 2008d). The central ques-
tions raised by Floridi’s PI project continue to attract critical attention, 
primarily in philosophy (Adams & de Moraes, forthcoming; Allo, 2010; 
Beavers, 2011; Caticha, 2014; Crnkovic & Hofkirchner, 2011; Durante, 
2011; Ess, 2009) and in areas of computer science (Benini & Gobbo, 2014; 
Colburn & Shute, 2011; Golan, 2014; Sicart, 2009; Wolf, Grodzinsky, & 
Miller, 2012), but the provocative questions posed to LIS in particular still 
remain largely unaddressed over a decade later (Floridi, 2004a, p. 659). 
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As Hjørland (2014) recently commented regarding the core concepts 
of LIS and the unexplored possibilities of PI, “We need to go from the 
concrete to the abstract and back again” (p. 231). This paper, therefore, 
will illustrate a few aspects of PI in the context of library and informa-
tion studies in the twenty years since the publication of Floridi’s “Internet: 
Which Future of Organized Knowledge, Frankenstein or Pygmalion?” 
(1995a) in hopes of eliciting further response from the field. 
The Philosophy of Library and Information Studies, 
Then and Now
The philosophy of library and information studies—whether “philoso-
phy” is construed as focusing on first-order questions within information 
studies inquiry or on second-order questions about information studies 
inquiry, and whether LIS is broadly or narrowly construed as librarian-
ship, library science, cataloging, documentation science, information sci-
ence, archival science, bibliographic studies, book history, information 
management, knowledge management, informatics, data science, records 
management, knowledge organization, analytical bibliography, document 
studies, textual studies, or some or all of the above—has traditionally 
been a matter of interest to some and indifference to most in these so-
called information professions. 
As early as 1933, Butler lamented: “Unlike his colleagues in other fields 
of social activity the librarian is strangely uninterested in the theoretical 
aspects of his profession. . . . The librarian apparently stands alone in the 
simplicity of his pragmatism: a rationalization of each immediate techni-
cal process by itself seems to satisfy his intellectual interest” (pp. xi–xiv). 
Shortly afterward, however, Danton (1934) wrote in The Library Quarterly: 
Sooner or later, however, if the purely pragmatic aspects of our profes-
sional thought are to be raised, it must be placed in its complete rela-
tions to the history of human thought. The library as a social institution 
is, after all, but one phase of its philosophical implications. Does the 
library have a Wesen of its own and does it have metaphysical implica-
tions? That is, is the library an institution merely or does it contain 
within itself the germs of a philosophical relation to epistemological 
progress? (p. 550)
Exploration of these metaphysical implications requires a considerable 
departure from the pragmatic, positivist approach employed in much of 
LIS literature, which typically focuses on evaluating the efficacy of prac-
tices intended to support user access through optimization of order and 
organization. Radford (1998) neatly described this pragmatic perspective 
in his observation that 
“a library is a place where knowledge is first classified and then kept, 
stored in texts of all kinds such as books, periodicals, and audiovisual ma-
terials. Such an understanding imposes a rigid structure of expectations  
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that come to define the library experience for both librarian and library 
user. . . . For both positivism and the library, the dominant metaphor is 
that of “the search.” In positivist science, the search is for underlying 
structures that comprise the truth of the natural world. In the library, 
the search is among the structures for a truth that will alleviate a specific 
“information need.” (p. 618)
Somewhat ironically, pragmatism as a movement appears to have been 
much more influential in such “practical” disciplines as LIS than it has 
ever been within its own academic discipline of philosophy (Campbell, 
2007). Perhaps even more ironically, contemporary metaphysics, which 
has been one of the dominant approaches within academic philosophy, 
has recently turned from its classic approach of modeling fundamental 
concepts about the world to more so-called naturalized attempts at meta-
physical modeling of the fundamental nature of the world itself, often 
employing techniques not dissimilar from those of scientific disciplines 
(Paul, 2012). Thus, Danton’s question about a possible “metaphysics of 
the library” may now elicit more focused attention to the potential an-
swers.
There have been a number of authors within LIS over the past eight 
decades who have concerned themselves specifically with we might call 
the metaphysical implications of the library writ large, and they have done 
so from a strikingly wide variety of philosophical and professional vantage 
points.1 Surprisingly little of this often-excellent work has received much 
attention from outside the LIS field, and, quite often dismayingly, little 
attention from inside it. Contrarily, Floridi’s (2002a, 2004a) work has suc-
ceeded in attracting more attention from fields outside LIS than from 
within it, although he notes that LIS appears to be an ideal field in which 
to practice PI.
Floridi asserts that his PI framework offers philosophically oriented 
scholars, including those in LIS, a new, information-centric approach to 
metaphysics, with an explicit focus on metatheoretical applications to var-
ious disciplines. However, despite the publication of his seminal Philosophy 
and Computing (1999b), as well as more recent publications like Informa-
tion (2010a), The Philosophy of Information (2011b), The Ethics of Information 
(2013a), and The Fourth Revolution (2014b), there has been little discus-
sion of PI and its potential for use in LIS since the two journal special is-
sues—one of Social Epistemology edited by Fallis (2002), and one of Library 
Trends edited by Herold (2004)—that first introduced Floridi’s work to 
the LIS community over a decade ago.
In particular, Floridi’s (2002a, 2004a) proposal that LIS be viewed as an 
applied form of PI has been countered by arguments that LIS already pos-
sesses an adequate philosophical base of its own, often identified as social 
epistemology (Budd, 2002; Fallis, 2006; Zandonade, 2004). Oddly, however, 
the concept of social epistemology as it is generally understood today has 
 introduction to the infosphere/martens 321
little or no direct connection with the term as originated by LIS theorists 
Egan and Shera, even while their original impetus for the concept (that 
is, in the service of continuous improvement of bibliographic services to 
users) is still firmly embedded in ongoing library work. The next section, 
therefore, will discuss that debate in some detail.
Social Epistemology, Then and Now
In 1950, Shera, of the University of Chicago’s Library School, reported 
in the pages of American Documentation that he and his Chicago colleague 
Egan had prepared and presented the U.S. report on national biblio-
graphic problems and activities at the UNESCO Conference on the Im-
provement of Bibliographic Services held in Paris. This conference, he 
noted, was an important first step in identifying the importance of bib-
liographic organization to international intellectual cooperation and the 
problems implicit in any effective program of action toward the improve-
ment of access to recorded knowledge (Shera, 1950). Soon afterwards, 
Egan and Shera’s (1952) seminal article “Foundations of a Theory of 
Bibliography” appeared in the pages of The Library Quarterly, introducing 
their concept of social epistemology, which they defined as 
the study of those processes by which society as a whole seeks to achieve 
a perceptive or understanding relation to the total environment—
physical, psychological, and intellectual. The derivation of the term is 
readily apparent. Epistemology is the theory or science of the methods 
and foundations of knowledge, especially with reference to the limits 
and validity of knowledge, and through it the philosopher seeks an 
understanding of how the individual achieves a perceptual or know-
ing relationship to his environment. Social epistemology merely lifts 
the discipline from the intellectual life of the individual to that of the 
society, nature, or culture. (p. 132)
Much of their ensuing emphasis, therefore, was on the improvement 
of knowledge-organization processes, such as the design, development, 
and diffusion of both bibliographic records and bibliometric data. After 
Egan’s death, Shera (1968) continued to develop the concept of social 
epistemology further during the next few decades through a series of es-
says and speeches, such as this presentation at the Foundations of Access 
to Knowledge conference held at Syracuse University:
The study of social epistemology, which is in reality the study of social 
cognition, is the proper foundation of the science of librarianship. 
As a study in its own right it must synthesize and draw upon the work 
of many disciplines, but it must always focus upon those processes 
by which society achieves a state of knowing and communicates its 
knowledge through its constituent parts. The librarian’s responsibility 
is the efficient and effective management of the transcript, the graphic 
record of all that society knows about itself and its world. It includes 
that which the social organism has learned, its values as well as its facts, 
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its imagery as well as its reality; it is at once historical, contemporary, 
and anticipatory. (pp. 24–25)
At the same time, however, Shera (1967) was careful not to discount 
the influence of technological advances, as he wrote in “Librarians against 
Machines”: 
That librarians are deeply troubled by the new technology can be di-
rectly attributed to their devoting excessive attention to the techniques 
of their craft, and to their neglect of the fundamental questions that 
they should have been asking. The computer could force them, at long 
last and in self-defense, to examine the philosophical implications of 
librarianship. It could also condition them for accommodation with 
areas of inquiry that have not previously been thought to be related 
to their work. (p. 749)
In fact, his tenure at Case Western was also notable for his efforts in es-
tablishing the Center for Documentation and Communication Research 
there, the first computerized research center associated with a library 
school. Despite Shera’s occasionally expressed reservations about this re-
search partnership (Wright, 1988, pp. 28–32), the center’s legacy to LIS 
(in particular, furthering development of the terms recall and precision in 
the evaluation of library information retrieval) has been widely acknowl-
edged. 
However, social epistemology failed to attract equal notice, with some 
exceptions, such as Brooks (1973), until, five years after Shera’s death 
in 1982, when it was reinvented and popularized by sociologist Fuller 
(1987a, 1987b) with the establishment of the journal Social Epistemology 
but without reference to libraries or librarianship (Zandonade, 2004). A 
1992 sidebar in American Libraries accompanying Pierce’s (1992) plaintive 
query as to “Who Are Our ‘Dead Germans’?” listed Shera among library 
educators’ top choices for significant theorists in LIS but without specify-
ing social epistemology as his theoretical contribution. Five years later, 
Zwadlo (1997) insisted in the pages of The Library Quarterly that there is 
no need at all for any philosophy of LIS. In rebuttal, Radford and Budd 
(1997) maintained that there is—but, again, Shera’s social epistemology 
failed to make an appearance in that discussion.
Twenty years after Shera’s death, however, and fifty years after the pub-
lication of Egan and Shera’s seminal article, Fallis edited a 2002 special 
issue of Social Epistemology devoted to the topic of social epistemology and 
information science, in which several articles (Budd, 2002; Dick, 2002; 
Furner, 2002b) recognized Egan and Shera’s foundational role and their 
coining of the term social epistemology. Floridi’s contribution (2002a) of-
fered a dissenting voice, arguing that social epistemology did not pro-
vide an appropriate conceptual structure for LIS. Instead, he suggested 
that the relationship between social epistemology and LIS is more that 
of sibling fields rather than of a foundational discipline and its derivative 
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(pp. 37–38). Floridi noted that social epistemology as it is presently un-
derstood is comprised of both the sociology of knowledge (SoK), which is 
the descriptive and empirical study of the historical causes and conditions 
of what is commonly recognized as knowledge, and the epistemology of 
social knowledge (ESK), which is the critical and conceptual study of the 
social dimensions of knowledge. 
Describing Shera’s view of social epistemology, however, Floridi dis-
cerned an unresolved tension in Shera’s writings between his desire to 
ground the library field in the epistemology of social knowledge as a sort 
of applied social epistemology and his desire to define the library field as 
the epistemology of social knowledge itself (2002a, p. 40). Floridi rejected 
both alternatives, pointing out that LIS takes a normative stance, as “the 
library is a place where educational and communication needs and values 
are implemented, defended, and fostered, where contents are assessed 
and selected for the public, and where practices like cataloging, for exam-
ple, are far from being neutral, evaluation-free activities” (p. 39), but that 
it cannot and should not be prescriptive in its perspective in the way that 
both what he called “classic” ESK (the socially distributed discovery and 
justification of knowledge as truth) and “revolutionary” ESK (the conten-
tion that knowledge, truth, and justification are all social constructions) 
are (p. 40). Further, LIS’s concerns are both broader (in terms of the 
wide range of both factual and fictional content that the library contains) 
and narrower (in that social epistemology deals with much outside the 
contents of any library, however broadly construed). 
Floridi maintained that LIS’s proper concern is not knowledge itself, 
but the information sources that make it possible, even if only indirectly 
(2002a, p. 41). This, in fact, is consistent with the original emphasis by 
Egan and Shera (1952) on “the analysis of the production, distribution, 
and utilization of intellectual products in much the same fashions in 
which the production, distribution, and utilization of material products 
have long been investigated. Graphic communication provides objective 
evidence of the process” (p. 133). Egan and Shera proposed two main ar-
eas of investigation: situational analysis, which involves a complete analysis 
of the kinds of information, knowledge, and insights developed by all the 
contributory sciences or disciplines that are brought to bear upon each 
of the many focal points of human activity (p. 135); and analysis of the 
information unit, involving techniques for the accurate description of the 
many “thought units” that comprise the flow of information, and to the 
creation of a method for identifying classes of these units briefly, through 
the use of symbols (p. 136).
In a thoughtful examination of the matter, Furner (2004a) concludes 
that Egan and Shera’s original concept of social epistemology is indeed 
quite different from previous work on the sociology of knowledge and the 
epistemology of knowledge that, if not inspired, informed its creation. 
324 library trends/winter 2015
He notes that it is also quite different from later and distinctive usages of 
the term social epistemology by Fuller (1988), Goldman (1999), and others 
and is more in the tradition of Otlet’s bibliology—another term that never 
gained wide circulation (Furner, 2002b, pp. 18–19). Nevertheless, much 
of their social epistemology legacy is still very much alive within LIS, 
both in situation analysis, better known as today’s “user studies” (Miksa, 
2009), and in analysis of the information unit, better known as “knowledge- 
organization studies” (Smiraglia, 2008)
Much of what Egan and Shera called the “pyramids,” comprising both 
micro- and macrobibliographic endeavors (1952, p. 126), and that Pat-
rick Wilson (1968, pp. 6–19) subsequently termed the bibliographical uni-
verse, has now been connected thanks to shared ventures in what Wilson 
identified as “descriptive control” (bibliographic and metadata formats, 
cataloging, indexing), as well as significant advances in what he called 
“exploitative control” (bibliometrics and scientometrics, information re-
trieval, relevance research). However, the advent of globally networked 
information and communication technologies has made it apparent that 
society’s graphical records extend far beyond the bibliographical uni-
verse as seen from within the library. The “archival multiverse” (Gilliland 
& McKemmish, 2012) has boundaries far beyond published documents 
alone, while the “records continuum” (Upward, 2000) extends into the 
past, present, and future of recorded memory, and even a “hypertextual 
documental universe” has been suggested (Gnoli & Ridi, 2014). As the 
Churchlands (1983) have observed, “The conglomeration which is the 
human brain standardly evolves an awesomely-complex world representa-
tion in short order and on the basis of scanty input. . . . [T]he world-rep-
resentation evolves, and it evolves not only during the lifetime of one hu-
man brain, but across the life-spans of collections of brains” (p. 5). Or, as 
Smiraglia (2008) elegantly summarizes, Egan and Shera’s vision of social 
epistemology was “a way of saying that a library arises in response to social 
demands that the culture of the society be collected and disseminated in 
a formal way” (p. 36).
Intriguingly, this aspect of Egan and Shera’s vision connects with Flo-
ridi’s (1996) own view of how 
the emergence of the human encyclopedia, as the totality of knowledge 
stored and inherited by generations of human beings through the cen-
turies, came to be governed by the humanistic prescription to the effect 
that knowledge is to be preserved at virtually any cost. . . . Post-modern 
philosophy—and I use the adjective only for want of a better label—
can be understood as the late philosophy which flourishes within the 
encyclopedia. . . . Knowledge is everywhere, and yet little is said upon 
its nature as an object, as a piece of reality, as an extended domain. 
Post-modern philosophy has moved too swiftly from reflecting upon the 
process of knowing—the modern concern with method—to reflecting 
within its result, leaving to information technology the task of providing 
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the ontic medium of the domain, and to social sciences the attempt to 
sketch its ontological description. (p. 30; emphasis in original)
This paragraph appears surprisingly close to one from Shera’s last article 
(1983), published posthumously, in which he observed that 
the library can be seen as three interrelated spheres: the sphere of 
optimum content, the operational or mechanistic sphere, and the 
sphere of maximum context. . . . Janus-like, the library looks in two 
directions simultaneously. It looks toward the social sciences, because 
it is a creature of society, evolved to meet the needs of human beings 
working towards the solution of certain problems. . . . But the library 
is also humanistic in that its characteristics, modes of access to its re-
sources, uses, and values are humanistic. It is not and never has been, 
a scientific enterprise. (p. 385)
Floridi (2002a) initially described the relationship between LIS and PI 
in the following terms: 
 (LIS) Library and Information Science as Applied Philosophy of Infor-
mation is the discipline concerned with documents, their life cycles and 
the procedures, techniques and devices by which these are implement-
ed, managed and regulated. LIS applies the fundamental principles 
and general techniques of PI to solve definite, practical problems and 
deal with specific, concrete phenomena. In turn, it conducts empiri-
cal research for practical service-oriented purposes (e.g. conservation, 
valorization, education, research, communication and co-operation), 
thus contributing to the development of basic research in PI. (p. 46)
Given these connections, Floridi’s contribution to LIS discourse may be 
significant in a much broader sense than merely as a critique of Egan’s 
and Shera’s ideas and can even be construed as an evolution from their 
initial effort “to provide a framework for the effective investigation of the 
whole complex problem of the intellectual processes of society” (Egan 
& Shera, 1952, p. 132), even as the UNESCO conference in 1995 was a 
successor to the one in 1950, into an exploration of what Floridi (2001a, 
pp. 18–19) calls the “infosphere.” Therefore, the next section will discuss 
Floridi’s philosophy of information in an attempt to clarify some of those 
relationships.
The Philosophy of Information, Then and Now
Although not readily apparent to readers without some familiarity with 
the ways in which contemporary philosophy is changing. (For accessible 
introductions for the nonspecialist to contemporary metaphysics, see 
Mumford [2012]; and to contemporary ontology, Effingham [2013].) Flo-
ridi’s PI seems to fall somewhere between two recent naturalistic turns in 
philosophy, the first being to a naturalized metaphysics, with its privileg-
ing of scientific reasoning as a way of constraining purely metaphysical 
speculation (Kincaid, 2013); and the second to object-oriented ontology, 
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with its principled refusal to privilege human experience over nonhuman 
things (Bryant, 2011). PI’s approach, with its focus on “structural infor-
mational realism” in general and “informational objects” in particular, 
attempts to provide a logically structured way for human reason to tran-
scend its origins in and focus on localized environments, and to address 
more universal concerns based on a wide variety of data from these local-
ized environments. As Vakarelov (2013) has pointed out, one of the most 
challenging aspects of this is the way in which Floridi uses “information” 
as a way to unify the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of his proj-
ect rather than as the goal of either. Epistemology and metaphysics are 
the two faces of the PI coin, while information provides the edge. 
PI uses a formal analytic methodology and specialized vocabulary in-
tended to study empirical, scientific, and social “observables” at various 
levels of abstraction through the explicit application of various theoreti-
cal lenses rather than implicitly privileging or reducing any of these. De-
spite its resemblance to both formal computer modeling and scientific 
methodology, PI retains its metaphysical identity in its commitment to 
“open” questions that are associated with “information,” very broadly 
construed, rather than addressing those questions that can be resolved 
conclusively through other means of investigation. Floridi’s most specific 
statement in this context is that “philosophical questions are in principle 
open, ultimate but not absolute questions, closed under further question-
ing, possibly constrained by empirical and logico-mathematical resources, 
which require noetic resources to be answered” (2013b, p. 215). “Noetic 
resources,” of course, are “informational” ones.
Floridi’s “What Is the Philosophy of Information?” appeared in Metaphi-
losophy in 2002 and described PI as concerning itself with both the histori-
cal antecedents and contemporary manifestations of philosophy as 
critical and creative investigations [that] identify, formulate, evaluate, 
clarify, interpret, and explain problems that are intrinsically capable 
of different and possibly irreconcilable solutions, problems that are 
genuinely open to debate and honest disagreement, even in principle. 
These investigations are often entwined with empirical and logico- 
mathematical issues and so are scientifically constrained, but, in them-
selves, they are neither. They constitute a space of inquiry broadly 
definable as normative. It is an open space: anyone can step into it, no 
matter what the starting point is, and disagreement is always possible. 
It is also a dynamic space, for when its cultural environment changes, 
philosophy follows suit and evolves. (2002c, p. 134) 
More specifically, he defines the philosophy of information as being
the philosophical field concerned with (a) the critical investigation of 
the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including 
its dynamics, utilisation, and sciences, and (b) the elaboration and 
application of information-theoretic and computational methodolo-
gies to philosophical problems. . . . Its task is not to develop a unified 
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theory of information but rather an integrated family of theories that 
analyse, evaluate, and explain the various principles and concepts of 
information, their dynamics and utilisation, with special attention to 
systemic issues arising from different contexts of application and in-
terconnections with other key concepts in philosophy, such as being, 
knowledge, truth, life, and meaning. (p. 137)
 This programmatic statement for doing philosophy informationally 
was followed by his “Open Problems in the Philosophy of Information” 
(2004b), again appearing in Metaphilosophy. This paper posed eighteen 
open problems as being central to PI, a list that can be only briefly sum-
marized as follows:
•	 Problem	1:	What	is	information?	
•	 Problem	2:	What	are	the	dynamics	of	information?	
•	 Problem	3:	Is	a	grand	unified	theory	of	information	possible?	
•	 Problem	4:	How	can	data	acquire	their	meaning?	
•	 Problem	5:	How	can	meaningful	data	acquire	their	truth	values?	
•	 Problem	6:	Can	information	explain	truth?	
•	 Problem	7:	Can	information	explain	meaning?	
•	 Problem	8:	Can	cognition	be	fully	and	satisfactorily	analyzed	in	terms	
of information processing at some level of abstraction? How is the triad 
of cognition, information processing, and level of abstraction to be in-
terpreted?
•	 Problem	9:	Can	natural	intelligence	be	fully	and	satisfactorily	analyzed	
in terms of information processing at some level of abstraction? 
•	 Problem	10:	Can	natural	intelligence	be	fully	and	satisfactorily	imple-
mented nonbiologically? 
•	 Problem	 11:	 Can	 an	 informational	 approach	 solve	 the	 mind–body	
problem? 
•	 Problem	12:	How	can	information	be	audited?	If	information	cannot	
be transcended but only checked against further information—if it is 
information all the way up and all the way down—what does this tell us 
about our knowledge of the world? 
•	 Problem	13:	 Should	 epistemology	 be	 based	on	 a	 theory	 of	 informa-
tion? 
•	 Problem	14:	Is	science	reducible	to	information	modeling?	
•	 Problem	15:	What	is	the	ontological	status	of	information?	
•	 Problem	16:	Can	information	be	naturalized?	
•	 Problem	17:	Can	nature	be	informationalized?	
•	 Problem	18:	Does	computer	ethics	have	a	philosophical	foundation?	
As Herold (2003) has noted, many of these open questions appear be-
yond the purview of even the most expansive notion of LIS, but several 
of them can be considered to be essential questions in even the narrow-
est view. He identified these as relating to content, meaning, authorship, 
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community, and ethics (pp. 562–563). Accordingly, Herold edited a spe-
cial issue of Library Trends in 2004 devoted to “the philosophy of informa-
tion,” introducing the issue with the statement that
researchers in LIS have increasingly turned to the efficacy of philosophi-
cal discourse in probing the more fundamental aspects of our theories, 
including those involving the information concept. A foundational 
approach to the nature of information, however, has not been real-
ized, either in partial or accomplished steps, nor even as an agreed, 
theoretical research objective. It is puzzling that while librarianship, in 
the most expansive sense of all LIS-related professions, past and pres-
ent, at its best sustains a climate of thought, both comprehensive and 
nonexclusive, information itself as the subject of study has defied our 
abilities to generalize and synthesize effectively. (p. 373)
The issue featured several articles that provided thoughtful critiques of 
various aspects of Floridi’s PI project in relationship to LIS concerns. In 
particular, articles by Cornelius (2004) on the failure of PI to account 
for LIS as a collection of ongoing social practices deeply grounded in 
information behavior by both information professionals and their com-
munities of users; Fallis (2004) on PI’s utility in assessing the accuracy of 
information; Frohmann (2004b) on the desirability of subsuming PI un-
der a broader, more historically grounded philosophy of documentation; 
and Jacob (2004) on classifying as a critical form of information dynamics 
offered some specific examples and counterexamples. 
Floridi (2004a) provided an afterword, expanding on his original 
(2002a) suggestions as to how PI might supply a better framework for LIS 
than does social epistemology, however defined. He proposed that a “PI ap-
proach to the foundations of LIS may be expected to work on the ontology 
of its (i.e., LIS’s) ‘objects,’ on a substantial theory of information dynamics, 
and on an ethical approach to the domain of information” (p. 659). 
The issue was received by the LIS community with mixed reactions (see, 
for example, Benoît, 2006; Buckland, 2005; Rayward, 2004; Wells, 2004) 
and with little subsequent attention to PI. Furner (2010) calls Floridi “the 
most prolific and most widely celebrated scholar working on problems of 
philosophy and information,” but one who is relatively infrequently cited 
in the LIS literature (pp. 170–171). Floridi is mentioned only once, for 
instance, in Osburn’s (2009) monograph on important works of “library 
philosophy,” and PI not at all. Furner (2010) listed four main attributes 
of PI to urge LIS researchers to increase their awareness and apprecia-
tion of Floridi’s project: its broadness of scope, its embeddedness in social 
theory, its utility for ethical analysis, and its foundational position at the 
heart of contemporary philosophy. According to him, two reasons that PI 
has failed to attract much sustained attention from LIS may be that Flo-
ridi’s books tend to focus on non-LIS-centric concerns, and that Floridi’s 
articles tend to be published in non-LIS-centric journals (pp. 171–173). 
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Two additional reasons may be, first, that his writing as “conceptual 
engineering” (Floridi, 2011a) offers a challenging blend of interrelated 
metaphysical and modeling concepts and vocabulary that cannot easily be 
understood within the context of a single article, and, second, that little 
effort has been made to situate PI within the LIS context, exploring its ad-
vantages and disadvantages. Exceptions to this latter point include Saab 
and Riis (2011) in their overview of contemporary definitions of informa-
tion, Tomic (2010) in her analysis of how PI might relate to information 
science, Fallis (2011) in his discussion of information and disinformation, 
Watson and Carlin (2012) in their critique of the neglected praxeological 
considerations involved in studying information, and Durante (2013) in 
his examination of the competing informational interests between civil 
rights and societal security within the global information society, as exem-
plified by legal cases. Thus, the next section will provide an elementary 
“pathfinder” for PI.
A Pathfinder for the Philosophy of Information
It should be noted that PI is clearly a work in progress, subject to a vari-
ety of criticisms (Doyle, 2010; Dunn 2013), while Floridi’s own prolific 
publications about it range from the engagingly accessible (2007) to the 
dauntingly technical (2008e). The following explanations, therefore, can 
be considered as elementary interpretations of some of the more basic 
concepts, using quotes from some of Floridi’s works as appropriate. Any 
and all errors of explanation or interpretation, however, are my own.
Information Structural Realism
Floridi (2008a) calls this a “liminal” realism, suggesting that it occupies 
a position midway between external realism (in which kinds, categories, 
and structures of the world are not a function of our conceptual schemes, 
either causally or ontologically) and internal realism (in which they are). 
Central to this neo-Kantian, intersubjective, socially constructible, dynam-
ic, and flexible perspective is his analytic method of abstraction (the levels 
of abstraction [LoA] approach) for application to the study, modeling, 
and analysis of phenomenological and conceptual systems as instanti-
ated by clusters or networks of observables that are identified and inter-
preted as “typed” variables so that their relationships and behavior can be 
formalized. 
This liminal realism also seems to offer a contact zone between phi-
losopher John Worrall’s (1989) work on “structural realism” and physicist 
John Wheeler’s (1990) work on “it from bit.” In Minds and Machines’s re-
cent special issue on PI, Bynum (2014) has speculated on the possibilities 
of quantum informational structural realism, which might link intrigu-
ingly with what Bawden, Robinson, and Siddiqui (forthcoming) identify 
as the potentialities of a “quantum turn” in information studies.
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Levels of Abstraction and Gradients of Abstraction
The LoA method is adapted from formalized modeling often used in in-
formation system design (Greco, Paronitti, Turilli, & Floridi, 2005), which 
in itself draws from metaphysics, particularly ontological design (Artz, 
1997). A helpful discussion of the uses of abstraction in general, and of 
Floridi’s approach in particular, can be found in Saitta and Zucker (2013). 
Floridi differentiates the LoA analytic methodology from other well-
known “leveling” methods of abstraction, such as the so-called LoO 
(levels of organization), which supports an ontological approach based 
on particular systemic attributes, and LoE (levels of explanation), which 
supports an epistemological approach based on particular nonsystemic 
attributes (2008d, p. 319). Both of these approaches, however, can be 
embedded within the LoA approach, as it also offers the opportunity 
through an “interface” named the “gradients of abstraction” (GoA) to 
compare multiple LoAs. Floridi notes that LoA analysis always requires 
a theoretical lens through which the observables can be studied, although 
these theoretical lenses can be of any kind. This allows him to defend LoA 
analysis from criticisms that have been leveled at seemingly similarly struc-
tured conceptual schemes (pp. 321–324). 
Additional discussions of the challenges posed by LoA/GoA work are 
offered by Gobbo and Benini (2014), who stress the potential value of cat-
egory theory in developing these levels of abstraction, and by van Leeu-
wen (2014), who suggests that an explicit system of annotations similar 
to those used in programming languages would help to specify bound- 
aries and constraints. Such proposed enhancements to the LoA/GoA ap-
proach may help to make it more readily accessible to interested scholars.
Data and Dedomena
Floridi (2008c) posits that a more basic, metaphysical concept of data 
is required than most definitions provide: neither the epistemic, which 
views data as facts, nor the informational, which views them as informa-
tion, nor the computational, which views them as collections of binary ele-
ments, is sufficiently fundamental. He asserts that data in themselves are 
unknowable without some “difference” to distinguish them. Therefore, 
he suggests that data be viewed as diaphoric; in other words, that difference 
is what defines data from nondata, and that a datum is ultimately reduc-
ible to a lack of uniformity. He proposes that “data in the wild”—that is, 
proto-epistemic data that have no interpretation—be termed dedomena, 
and notes that they cannot be accessed or elaborated independently of 
some level of abstraction. Thus, dedomena are whatever lack of unifor-
mity in the world that serve as the source of whatever we interpret as data 
(p. 235). 
Lack of interpretation or misinterpretation, however, does not pre-
clude future interpretation or reinterpretation. Interpreted (or misinter-
preted), dedeomena can become what we term data. Such interpretation 
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entails either the lack of uniformity between (the perception of) at least 
two physical states, such as that of a system (for instance, between con-
nection and disconnection within an electrical circuit), or it can be the 
lack of uniformity between two symbols of a code (for instance, the letters 
“A” and “B” in the English alphabet). Floridi (2011b) notes that the ac-
tual format, medium, and language in which data are encoded are often 
irrelevant and hence disregardable. His proposal of dedomena as proto-
epistemic data provides a potentially useful way of distinguishing it from 
data, which can then be subdivided into the five commonly used catego-
ries of primary, secondary, metadata, operational, and derivative data. All 
such data might then be further interpreted as “informational objects” 
(pp. 87–88).
Informational Objects
Informational objects, or as Floridi (2012b) has recently dubbed them, 
“i-objects,” are also foundational to his view of reality, or what he calls “in-
formation structural realism” (p. 268). He (2008a) states that a “straight-
forward way of making sense of these structural objects is as informational 
objects, that is, as cohering clusters of data, not in the alphanumeric sense 
of the word, but in an equally common sense of differences de re, i.e., mind-
independent, concrete points of lack of uniformity” (p. 236). These in-
formational objects then can be viewed as observables at various levels of 
abstraction, giving different pictures of their data structure and associated 
behavior appropriate to each level.
Information
Floridi’s (2009) definition of information is clearly a semantic one. He 
notes that “information is notoriously a polymorphic phenomenon and 
a polysemantic concept so, as an explicandum, it can be associated with 
several explanations, depending on the level of abstraction adopted and 
the cluster of requirements and desiderata orientating a theory” (p. 13). 
A simple schematic of how information may appear to PI is as follows: any 
initial appearance of “structured” data can presumably be separated into 
either environmental data or semantic content. Semantic content can fur-
ther be separated into instructional or factual content. Factual content 
can further be separated into untrue and true content. Untrue content 
can be further separated into disinformation (intentional untruth) and 
misinformation (unintentional untruth). True content cannot be subdi-
vided further, and may result in knowledge (p. 15).
Ultimately, Floridi wishes to refine the generalized definition of informa-
tion (GDI), which is normally defined as semantic content consisting of 
one or more data that are well-formed and meaningful (2009, p. 16). His 
preferred revision is that declarative, objective, and semantic information 
should consist of well-formed, meaningful, and truthful data (2005, p. 
367). There have been a number of critiques (Fetzer, 2004; Long, 2014; 
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Scarantino & Piccinini, 2010), as well as defenses (Sequoiah-Grayson, 
2007) of Floridi’s definitions of information.
Of particular interest to LIS is Floridi’s “correctness” theory of truth, 
which provides for those special instances in which categories of fictional, 
empirical, ethical, modal, dispositional, metaphorical, and other seman-
tic content are of interest (2011b, pp. 182–208). All these can be dealt 
with as information, provided that attention is given to the levels of abstrac-
tion at which they are being analyzed. For instance, “Dr. Watson is Sher-
lock Holmes’s best friend” is true within a level of abstraction that deals 
specifically with that fictional world (pp. 203–204), but not within a level 
that deals with historical data from the nineteenth century. 
Infosphere
Floridi’s PI is perhaps most widely associated with this term, even though it 
was actually originated by Boulding in 1970. Boulding viewed the infosphere 
as one among the six “spheres” in his own system (which also included the 
sociosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere, and atmosphere), and 
suggested that each individual or group of individuals exists as a node in 
a network of inputs and outputs of information, symbols, and language. 
He claimed that 
the infosphere then consists of inputs and outputs of conversation, 
books, television, radio, speeches, church services, classes, and lectures 
as well as information received from the physical world by personal 
observation. . . . It is clearly a segment of the sociosphere in its own 
right, and indeed it has considerable claim to dominate the other seg-
ments. It can be argued that development of any kind is essentially a 
learning process and that it is primarily dependent on a network of 
information flows. (pp. 15–16)
Unsurprisingly, given that he was writing almost thirty years later, Floridi’s 
reinvention of the term infosphere is independent of, and quite significant-
ly different from, that of Boulding. Floridi (1999b) states that 
the computerised description and control of the physical environment, 
together with the digital construction of a synthetic world, are, finally, 
intertwined with a fourth area of application, represented by the trans-
formation of the encyclopadeic macrocosm of data, information, ideas, 
knowledge, beliefs, codified experiences, memories, images, artistic 
interpretations, and other mental creations into a global infosphere. The 
infosphere is the whole system of services and documents, encoded in 
any semiotic and physical media, whose contents include any sort of 
data, information and knowledge . . . with no limitations either in size, 
typology, or logical structure. Hence it ranges from alphanumeric texts 
(i.e., texts, including letters, numbers, and diacritic symbols) and mul-
timedia products to statistical data, from films and hypertexts to whole 
text-banks and collections of pictures, from mathematical formulae to 
sounds and videoclips. (p. 8; emphasis in original)
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  More recently, Floridi (2009) has noted that the infosphere is being 
both developed and defragmented as it continues more or less simul-
taneously and spontaneously to erase barriers between production and 
consumption of information, between databases of information, between 
who does and does not have effective availability and accessibility to in-
formation, between physical and global access to information, and, ulti-
mately, between here (offline, analog, carbon-based) and there (online, 
digital, silicon-based). He argues that the infosphere serves as our access 
to foundations of the information reality that is the universe, even though 
he asserts that this does not entail a so-called computational universe, 
such as that posited by the “digital metaphysics” of Steinhart (1998), for 
example. PI views information as not only foundational, but fundamental 
in a way that Boulding’s concept clearly does not. However, our access to 
these foundations is necessarily mediated through our augmented ability 
to explore and observe them (Floridi, 2003).
Reontologization
Floridi (2007) states that reontologization is another neologism that he cre-
ated to refer to a very radical form of reengineering, one that fundamen-
tally transforms the intrinsic nature of a particular system. The term clear-
ly carries connotations related to the distinctive usages of ontology in both 
analytical philosophy and software engineering, and is also reminiscent of 
Heidegger’s (1953/2010) somewhat similar creation of neologisms from 
familiar technical terms in Being and Time.
Floridi (2001b) claims that digital information and communication 
technologies are reontologizing the very nature of (and hence what we 
mean by) the infosphere as reality by making it “frictionless” through the 
transition from analog to digital data and the ever-increasing growth of 
digital space. He warns that this reontologization will have serious societal 
consequences, as the “digital divide” will be not only between those who 
do and do not have access but also between those who can impact and 
those who can only be impacted by the results. His concern is the greater 
because of the awareness that
it is precisely those high-technology societies, which have brought about 
the information revolution, [that] seem to be the least able to cope 
with its ethical impact. Pre- or non-industrial cultures, which have been 
able to maintain a non-materialistic and nonconsumistic approach to 
the world, are still spiritual enough to perceive in both physical and 
immaterial realities something intrinsically worthy of respect, simply as 
forms of existence. They may not be environmentally sensitive, but they 
can be important sources to develop an ecological approach that will 
make the infosphere a more civilized space for all. The environmental 
ethics of the infosphere must be built by considering also the needs 
and input of its “outsiders.” (p. 4)
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Fourth Revolution
Floridi (2008b, 2014b) claims that we have entered a fourth revolution in 
human thinking about the universe and our place in it, although this re-
alization is not yet widespread and certainly not universal. He posits that 
the first revolution was the Copernican in which we became aware that 
the earth was not the center of the universe; the second was the Darwin-
ian in which we became aware that human beings were subject to the same 
evolutionary processes as other organisms; and the third was the Freudian 
in which we became aware that our cognitive processes can be both com-
plex and opaque beyond our conscious knowledge. This fourth revolu-
tion currently in progress, according to Floridi (2012c), the “Turingian,” 
is grounded on the idea that we are becoming aware that we are infor-
mationally embodied organisms or inforgs who are mutually connected 
and embedded in an informational environment, the infosphere, which we 
share with both natural and artificial agents similar to us in many respects 
(p. 3540). Although there are several potential milestones with which 
to date the start of this revolution, Floridi (2014b) marks it by that vital 
period of intellectual activity leading up to the 1950 publication of Tur-
ing’s seminal paper in Mind on computing machinery and intelligence 
(pp. 93–94).
Floridi’s (2001b) informational revolution also presents two gaps. The 
first is what he terms vertical and ahistorical: this divide is between past mo-
dernity, which focuses purely on mastery of the physical world, and post-
modernity, which focuses on the alternative, nonnatural environments that 
replace or underpin it. The second gap is what he terms horizontal and ethi-
cal: this divide is between those who do and those who do not have digital 
access, which mandates the creation of a universal information ethics that 
would ensure a safe, equitable, and public infosphere for all (pp. 2–3).
Information Ethics
Although information ethics (IE) has become a well-known term within 
both philosophical (for example, Moor, 1985) and professional (for ex-
ample, Mason, 1986) practice since Weiner’s early work on “computer 
ethics” (Bynum, 2008, 2010), Floridi’s (2013a) development of IE is novel 
in that it has broadened the scope of discourse to an almost universal 
macroethics centered on information. His more expansive concerns are 
expressed as follows:
In IE, the ethical discourse concerns any entity, understood informa-
tionally, that is, not only all persons, their cultivation, well-being and 
social interactions, not only animals, plants and their proper natural 
life, but also anything that exists, from paintings and books to stars and 
stones; anything that may or will exist, like future generations; and any-
thing that was but is no more, like our ancestors or old civilizations. IE 
is impartial and universal because it brings to ultimate completion the 
process of enlargement of the concept of what may count as a centre 
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of a (no matter how minimal) moral claim, which now includes every 
instance of being understood informationally . . . no matter whether 
physically implemented or not. (2006a, p. 26; emphasis in original)
IE thus suggests that there is something even more valuable than life 
and consciousness—namely, being, understood as information; and there 
is something more wrongful than pain and suffering—namely, a lack of 
meaningfulness that is seen as information entropy. According to IE, 
one should evaluate the duty of any rational being in terms of his or her 
contribution to the growth of the infosphere, and any process, action, or 
event that negatively affects the whole infosphere—not just an informa-
tion object—as an increase in its level of entropy and hence an instance of 
evil. Without information there is no moral action, but in IE, information 
moves from being a necessary prerequisite for any morally responsible ac-
tion to being its primary object (Floridi & Sanders, 2002).
Central to Floridi’s argument for an information macroethics is the 
notion that all entities, even those that do not qualify as “information or-
ganisms” as such, may possess a minimal informational value that qualify 
them as “moral patients” worthy of at least some respect by other agents, 
notably by human beings (Floridi & Sanders, 2002). Thus, both informa-
tion organisms and informational objects can be agents (that is, actively 
affecting other entities) or patients (that is, being actively affected by other 
entities) at any given time, regardless of whether either agent or patient 
is a living entity. 
Floridi’s information macroethics therefore requires that ethical con-
siderations expand beyond the traditional ones that have been centered 
around human beings and certain living entities considered as close to 
human beings. While there are a number of philosophical precedents 
concerning moral agency among humans and nonhumans (Mitcham, 
2014), this is clearly one of the most provocative aspects of Floridi’s PI 
proposals. Critics like Brey (2008) and Byron (2010) argue that Floridi’s 
ethical expansion of IE beyond the current boundaries of both bio-ethics 
and eco-ethics has failed so far to make an acceptable case for treating 
all entities as having any such intrinsic value, informational or otherwise.
Information Entropy
As noted above, Floridi’s (1999a) information ethics is partially predicat-
ed on mitigating the evil of what he calls “information entropy” in the 
infosphere. The four tenets regarding this are that entropy ought not to 
be caused in the infosphere (null law); entropy ought to be prevented in 
the infosphere; entropy ought to be removed from the infosphere; and 
information welfare ought to be promoted by extending (information 
quantity), improving (information quality), and enriching (information 
variety) the infosphere (p. 47).
Again, this has attracted criticism, notably from McKinlay (2013), who 
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comments that Floridi’s use of the term entropy in connection with infor-
mation needs much clearer definition, as it has little in common with the 
more familiar use of entropy in physics. In particular, McKinlay suggests 
that information entropy is not necessarily an evil, but rather an unavoid-
able consequence of informational activity creating desired complexity 
elsewhere in the infosphere. And, even in the case of the information 
entropy presumably caused by “bad objects” like computer viruses and 
spam, there are those who would advocate for a more nuanced response 
to their existence (Parikka & Sampson, 2009), making the issue consider-
ably more complex than Floridi’s tenets would appear to allow.
Information Organism
Floridi’s term information organism, or inforg, while both related to and 
reminiscent of cyborg (Clynes & Kline, 1960; Haraway, 1991) and informa-
vore (Miller, 1983), is intended to encompass all information-processing 
mechanisms, ranging from those that can only process data at an elemen-
tary level (for example, a sunflower responding to sunlight as informa-
tion) to the most advanced (a network of supercomputers). While Flo-
ridi’s focus is on human beings as inforgs because of their special nature 
as “structuring structures” that are self-conscious and self-determining 
(2010c, pp. 279–280), there seems to be room in his definition to include 
not only nonhumans like poker bots and bomb-disposal robots but also 
self-organizing social structures that process information, such as corpo-
rations or nations. While Floridi’s PI may possess surface similarities to 
other contemporary projects centered around the recognition of the im-
portance of the nonhuman, it remains distinctive, in that PI is grounded 
in information rather than materialism as in the work of Harman (2005) 
and other object-oriented philosophers, or in networks as in the work of 
Latour (2005) and other actor-network sociologists, as well as in its impli-
cations for the future (Giardino, 2012).
Knowledge
Information, whether transmitted via perception or testimony, according 
to Floridi (2014a), “upgrades” to knowledge only if it can be correctly 
“accounted for” through an active process of question and answer by the 
knower. This definition of knowledge is supported by an extensive infra-
structure of his earlier work on the symbol grounding problem (Taddeo 
& Floridi, 2005), action-based semantics (Taddeo & Floridi, 2007), defini-
tions of semantic information (Floridi, 2005, 2010b), the logic of “being 
informed” (Floridi, 2006b), epistemic relevance (Floridi, 2008e), and a 
network theory of account (Floridi, 2012a). Floridi (2014a) concludes 
that the philosophical “problem of justification” (that is, defining “justi-
fied, true belief” by a knower) can be addressed more pragmatically by 
viewing knowers as reality’s active, problem-solving designers rather than 
its passive observers:
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We are cognitive amphibians: as embodied and embedded physical 
agents, we live in, and interact with the world in itself, Kant’s noumena. 
We eat and drink, handle and build, avoid and crash into noumena. But 
as informational organisms, we experience and inhabit the world as a 
semantic reality both afforded and constrained by the world in itself. 
Our ontology is entirely semantic, so we know the world when we are 
informed about it and are able to account for such information. For 
a knower is “the man who knows how to ask and answer questions” 
(Plato, Cratylus), giving an account, that is, about the information that 
he holds. (p. 93)
 Although this account of knowledge as “upgraded” information of 
shared perceptions and testimonies within a social network of “cogni-
tive amphibians” over time is clearly still a subject of much philosophical 
debate (Allo, 2014; Harnad, 2011; Piazza, 2010; Primiero, 2013), it also 
serves to connect the philosophy of information to some of the most cen-
tral concepts and concerns of LIS. The next section will now turn to some 
of PI’s possible applications within library and information studies.
The Infosphere of Information Studies
As noted above, Floridi (2004a) suggests that a PI approach to the foun-
dations of LIS may be expected to work on the ontology of its (that is, 
LIS’s) “objects,” on a substantial theory of information dynamics, and on 
an ethical approach to the domain of information (p. 659). This section 
will address how PI might relate to other LIS works in progress in each of 
these areas.
The Ontology of LIS Objects
Despite an increasing interest in ontological development within the 
field, most ontic models in LIS are not intended for general use, as they 
tend to reflect a single concrete area of researcher interest. The one well-
known model in LIS that does arguably resemble an abstract ontology 
of generic information “objects” is the so-called DIKW (data-information-
knowledge-wisdom) Pyramid or Hierarchy, variously attributed to Adler, 
Ackoff, Zeleny, and others (Rowley, 2007). However, Frické (2009) has 
deftly exposed its definitional deficiencies, logical inconsistencies, and 
faulty dependencies, pointing to its outmoded reliance upon a systems 
worldview based on operationalism and instrumentalism and stating that 
it should be abandoned as a model.
As Floridi (2004a) notes, “LIS deals with contents understood as mean-
ingful data [and] connected with the activity of stewardship of a semantic 
environment” (p. 662). But in order to be considered as a foundational 
philosophy for LIS, PI must offer a useful way of looking at a perennial 
“open problem” in LIS: what should be construed as the “objects” of in-
formation studies when there are so many possibilities from the dispa-
rate domains from which all these are drawn? Since the primary concerns 
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of LIS include both the stewardship of collections of LIS objects and, 
critically, the responsibility for the accuracy and accessibility of their 
representations as well, this will be an increasingly complex issue in the 
“reontologized” world that PI presupposes.
Although Floridi has proposed that LIS’s data consist of documents 
and their life cycles, that itself is an open question, as “documents,” even 
within the more traditional LIS contexts, are largely undefined. (See 
Buckland [1991, 1997], Frohmann [2009], Hjørland [2002a], and Lund 
[2009, 2010] for discussions of the nature of documents.) Buckland has 
observed, following Briet (1951/2006), that “the document,” rather than 
being viewed solely as texts or as variations in textual format, should be 
more accurately viewed as any “thing” that can be interpreted as some 
kind of evidence, whether textual or otherwise. Documents can take phys-
ical or virtual form, or both, at different times. “Evidence” also is prob-
lematic, as library examples of even clearly textual documents include an 
extensive variety of both evidentiary (Furner, 2004b) and nonevidentiary 
(Hanley, 2004) instances that can only begin to indicate the range of po-
tential interpretations, both factual and fictional, over the millennia. The 
Cuneiform Digital Library Initiative, for instance, has facilitated interpre-
tations of accounting practices in ancient Mesopotamia (Monaco, 2005), 
while the Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project has done the same for inves-
tigations into the mythological roots of the First Dynasty of Uruk there 
(Woods, 2012).
Another critically important informational object closely related to 
questions of evidence is the record, which has also been undergoing sub-
stantial and substantive reconsiderations in both archival and records-
management studies (Yeo, 2007, 2008, 2012b). Questions problematizing 
the definition and description of records (Conway, forthcoming; Duff & 
Harris, 2002; MacNeil, 2005; Millar, 2002; Yakel, 2003), the construction 
of their identity (Rowat, 1993; Trace, 2002; Yeo, 2010), their contextual 
aspects (McKemmish & Piggott, 2013; Nesmith, 2006), their temporal 
aspects (K. Anderson, 2013; Brothman, 2006; Cumming, 2010; Meehan, 
2006, 2009; Upward, 1996, 2009), and their custodial communities (Bas-
tian, 2002; Caswell, 2013; Christen, 2012; Huvila, 2008) have become en-
demic within the archival field, leading Upward and colleagues (2013) 
to lament that “we cannot reliably say what a record as a thing is as our 
conceptual understanding of it blurs into data, documents, information, 
the archive, and the plurality of archives. . . . Our new information spaces 
with their vibrant diversity are paradoxically producing a collapse of col-
lective memory” (p. 40). In their examination of the archival literature 
and the concept of collective memory, however, Jacobsen and colleagues 
(2013) note that the archival field has been more insulated from other 
disciplines engaging in memory studies and the encompassing environ-
ment of collective-memory work in the world at large than archivists 
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themselves may realize. Thus, all this may portend less a collapse than 
a convergence in which these critical questions about evidence, signifi-
cance, and temporality will become far more widely appraised both inside 
and outside LIS (Cook, 2011, 2013).
In addition to documents and records, there are other potentially vi-
able candidates for roles as LIS objects. For instance, Ekbia (2009) has ad-
vanced a processual and relational theory of digital artifacts as quasi-objects 
in which he draws together actor-network theory, documentation theory, 
and object-oriented philosophy—a proposed advance on traditional docu-
ment studies. Also, Budd (2013b) has recently published a quantum theory 
approach to information studies that addresses the problematic of perceiv-
ing information with the aim of finding meaning in the microstructures 
of small linguistic elements rather than the macrolevel of texts, which 
could dramatically both increase and impact LIS research endeavors.
Miksa (1998) has examined and dismissed the notion that library 
classifications like Dewey’s have historically had anything more than a ten-
uous connection with direct classification efforts in the sciences or knowl-
edge in general. Representation of objects, such as books, in LIS has 
traditionally worked from an indirect or “second-hand knowledge” (Wil-
son, 1983) perspective: for instance, the aspect classification of bibliograph-
ic description, which loosely resembles a compilation of categories based 
on the informal ontologies of various phenomena as viewed from within 
disciplines; and the occurrence representation of records management, which 
loosely resembles an account-driven data-file structure within organiza-
tions rather than through the creation of more abstract and formal ontol-
ogies. However, there has been growing concern that such representation 
must inevitably fail to accurately reflect the wide range of relevant world 
views on actual content and should be completely rethought (Feinberg, 
2007; Mai, 2010, 2011; Szostak, 2013). 
Nevertheless, representation of content remains absolutely essential 
to LIS despite these challenges. Certain efforts appear to be successfully 
maneuvering through these thorny thickets of complexity. For instance, 
Smiraglia’s seminal publications (2001, 2002, 2005) on “works” include 
the phenomenon of instantiation in the bibliographic representation of 
knowledge about works, which are increasingly likely to have multiple 
manifestations in space (a series of filmed performances, for instance) 
and/or time (several editions of a book, for instance) that constitute sets 
of representations of a work. All these, then, form a content genealogy im-
portant to identifying information objects of any kind. In addition, Furner 
(2002a) has observed that works are entangled in extensive networks of 
document relatedness, such as associated metadata frameworks or cita-
tion networks, which may be considered as LIS objects in their own right 
as well, while Day (2008b) has made an equally far-ranging exploration of 
the entanglements of works of art. Beyond these classic approaches, yet 
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another emerging knowledge-representation initiative is the León Mani-
festo, which proposes treating each “knowledge item” itself as the basic 
unit for classification rather than employing the disciplinary approach of 
traditional cataloging, but which would also allow for more global-level 
descriptors (Gnoli, 2010). 
Further, there is the question of information objects, whatever they 
may be, as part of sets or collections or as sets or collections in them-
selves (Wickett, Renear, & Furner, 2011). Moreover, even the question of 
“what is a collection” in LIS is far from resolved, although a number of 
researchers have addressed it (Currall, Moss, & Stuart, 2005, 2006; Lee, 
2000; Manoff, 2006, 2010; Martens, 2011; Yeo, 2012a, 2012b).
All of this points to a key advantage for PI as a framework for LIS: 
that despite an understandable concentration on and commitment to ve-
ridical truth in defining information, which Floridi shares with the many 
other philosophers since Bertrand Russell who have faced the so-called 
problems of reference (see Pepp [2012] for a useful contemporary intro-
duction to these), Floridi’s informational framework for semantic content 
can make provision for fiction (that is, the rich imaginary that provides 
the majority of our cultural heritage) as well as fact when employed at the 
appropriate level(s) of abstraction, without resorting to relativism. 
There are certainly sufficient precedents in the philosophical litera-
ture to warrant the further exploration of fictional semantic content (see, 
for example, Lewis, 1978; Thomasson, 1999; Voltolini, 2006; Walton, 
1990) in LIS, in addition to that of factual semantic content, especially 
as the “fictions” involved can also be said to be somewhat similar to those 
routinely employed in mathematical and scientific modeling (Contessa, 
2010; Frigg, 2010). 
Floridi (2004a) writes that “the semanticization of data is a modeling 
process at some level of abstraction [LoA]. . . . According to the [LoA] 
methodology, any access to data (and hence any access to whatever aspect 
of the world is under scrutiny) is mediated by an ontological commitment 
to a level of abstraction that can be roughly understood as an interface” 
(p. 662). He goes on to assert: “We neither discover nor invent the world; 
we design it. So we understand it derivatively, only insofar as we under-
stand its models. The world as we experience it every day is the outcome 
of our modeling its data with a degree of intra-LoAs coherence as great as 
one may wish. This is neither a realist nor an antirealist but a construction-
ist view of information” (p. 663; emphasis in original).
For LIS, whether called documents, records, or works, all such evi-
dence or documentary reality is, in reality, somehow constructed by hu-
man beings directly through creation and elaboration or more indirectly 
through observation and explanation. Although the interpretations 
may be lost, as is the case with the Voynich manuscript and the Tartaria 
tablets, or yet to be completed, as with the cladistics of viruses and the 
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Langlands conjectures in mathematics, or are fully shared only within a 
certain group, as with string theorists and song-line speakers, all these 
still remain part of the library. The library encompasses much more than 
reified technical knowledge, although our current, taken-for-granted 
emphasis on science, and particularly “information science,” tends to ob-
scure this fact. Floridi’s (2009) own schematic of information may well 
need to be redrawn to incorporate some of these major contributions 
from LIS’s enduring stewardship of the full social transcript into the over-
all PI project itself (p. 15).
This vast residual category in PI’s general metaphysical framework for 
exploring the meanings and interpretations of information objects re-
veals enormous scope for LIS investigations in support of what Floridi 
(2002a, p. 46) himself views, in MacLeish’s words (1972, p. 361), as “the li-
brary’s implicit assertion of the immanence of meaning.” Whether or not 
Floridi’s fourth revolution occurs as he suggests, in any meaningful sense of 
the term, LIS will continue to include The Analects of Confucius, The Epic of 
Gilgamesh, and The Tale of Genji, as well as base-ten arithmetic, the periodic 
table, and the solar calendar. Thus, the ontological concerns of LIS are 
likely to have important implications for PI as well.
Information Dynamics
Floridi’s (2002c) recommended second foundational focus of attention 
for LIS is “a substantial theory of information dynamics.” He describes 
information dynamics for PI in general as
(i) the constitution and modelling of information environments, including 
their systemic properties, forms of interaction, internal developments, 
and so on; (ii) information life cycles, that is, the series of various stages in 
form and functional activity through which information can pass, from 
its initial occurrence to its final utilisation and possible disappearance; 
and (iii) computation both in the Turing-machine sense of algorithmic 
processing and in the wider sense of information processing. . . . PI privi-
leges “information” over “computation” as the pivotal topic of the new 
field because it analyses the latter as presupposing the former. (p. 138; 
emphasis in original)
Among the most substantial and substantive theories relevant to LIS-
related information environments developed over the past two decades 
is Hjørland’s seminal work on domain analysis (Hjørland & Albrechtsen, 
1995), which Tomic (2010) has suggested provides a useful complementary 
approach to Floridi’s PI, with connections that could be further explored. 
While Tomic detailed some specific philosophical avenues of connection, 
this section will focus on a more general discussion of the two. 
Domain analysis as defined by Hjørland (2002b) offers a philosophi-
cal foundation, as well as a practical toolkit of recommended techniques 
(2002a). Hjørland’s (2010) sociocognitive approach posits that studying 
specific discourse communities, such as a scientific specialty, professional 
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field, or other interacting group of participants who share a common area 
of expertise, is the optimal way to understand the creation, dissemina-
tion, and utilization of knowledge, as the shared concepts, vocabularies, 
activities, and communication processes of such groups of subject experts 
will eventually result in the research findings and other recommendations 
described in the various publications that will be acquired and accessed 
through libraries, also providing the foundation for the development of 
subject headings, keywords, and other bibliographic infrastructures, thus 
forming the basis of society’s knowledge as a whole. This inherent privi-
leging of the cognitive aspects over the social in Hjørland’s approach to 
discourse communities has been seen as problematic (Fry, 2006), but it 
also helps to maintain a clear focus on epistemic considerations. 
Domain analysis does allow for individual variations both within and 
between such groups, recognizing that the growth of knowledge is both 
a competitive and cooperative concern among the group members, and 
that their cognitive and social backgrounds, styles, and interactions all play 
key roles (Hjørland & Hartel, 2003). While Hjørland’s (2000b) domain- 
analytic project is grounded in both the philosophy of science and the 
sociology of science, it also draws from both the information-retrieval 
and knowledge-organization aspects of LIS. Unlike many other research 
specialty studies, however, which have tended to focus primarily on the 
specialists themselves, their processes, and/or their research products 
(Velden & Lagoze, 2013), domain analysis is particularly suited for the 
study of how various domains interface with LIS. For instance, it has been 
used to chart changes in interdisciplinary journal choices within the com-
putational sciences over a fifty-year time frame (Tanaka, 2010); to com-
pare the curricula for “relevance work” in archival, reference, and com-
petitive intelligence education at ALA-accredited library schools (Mar-
tens & Van Fleet, 2012); and to analyze factors impacting the sharing of 
research data within five subdomains of earth systems sciences (Weber, 
Baker, Thomer, Chao, & Palmer, 2012). 
As Tennis (2012) has pointed out, domain analysis can be practiced in 
several ways: as a descriptive analysis for basic research; as an instrumen-
tal analysis for practical applications; and as a contextual analysis for a 
deeper understanding of the domain itself, its possible changes over time, 
and how it is being analyzed. PI appears as though it could be especially 
helpful in this third, more reflexive mode of domain analysis. A domain 
analytic approach informed by PI might use the LoA/GoA approach to 
view domains at various levels of abstraction, using different theories, and 
focusing on different observables to provide a more coherent picture of 
those parts of the infosphere of special interest to LIS over time.
While there has been criticism directed at LoA in PI because “it trades 
upon decontextualized uses and recontextualizes ‘information’ for the 
practical purposes of formal analysis” (Watson & Carlin, 2012, p. 327), 
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PI clearly does not prescribe or proscribe the methods of investigation, 
as seen above, but may provide a structure and syntax to facilitate consid-
ered comparisons at various levels.
In summary, PI is not intended to provide a replacement for scientific 
methods of investigation. It can serve as more of an meta-analytic overlay 
on all existing research practices, providing a metaphysical commentary 
on what is being researched, and why. In the current LIS research envi-
ronment, which largely focuses on methodological rigor and practical ap-
plications, this can be seen as both unrealistic and unnecessary, but there 
is clearly a place for such deeper “philosophical” perspectives on our own 
domain. Whether LIS is willing to undertake such an effort certainly re-
mains an open question as well.
Information Ethics
As noted above, Floridi’s information macro-ethics (IE) is largely predi-
cated on our developing sense of stewardship of the infosphere. His pro-
posal that information objects should have moral rights because they also 
embody information is probably the most controversial and celebrated 
part of his PI project, as it goes far beyond Weiner’s foundational work 
pertaining to “the human use of human beings” (Bynum, 2008). One 
obvious application of this thesis for LIS is the destruction of archives, 
books, and libraries, referred to as “archivicide,” “bibliocide,” and “libri-
cide” respectively. Although other authors have discussed historical cases 
and causes in extensive and exhaustive detail (Báez, 2008; Fishburn, 2008; 
Knuth, 2003, 2006; Owens, 2012; Polastron, 2007), there has been little 
discussion of any possible moral rights of the documents themselves, ei-
ther individually or collectively, apart from those of their creators or pos-
sessors. Such a discussion, however, is almost inevitable in the context of 
Floridi’s fourth revolution.
The fourth revolution, both creating and being created by the info- 
sphere, involves subjective, radical change even beyond the two gaps to 
which Floridi (2001b) refers: the vertical, ahistorical gap between moder-
nity and postmodernity, and the horizontal and ethical gap between access 
and nonaccess. A third gap exists, one that is orthogonal and unpredict-
able: the sudden, subjective realization that one is oneself embedded in 
the infosphere is likely to be empowering, unsettling, or both, depending 
on the individual’s own information-seeking and information-processing 
proclivities, and is not contingent simply on the availability of access to 
these alternative environments. 
The human rights of displaced refugees, for instance, can easily be 
foreclosed within the “virtualized” mapping system of protected territo-
ries imposed by international agencies in which the actual persons may 
not “count” for more than their digital surrogates (Franke, 2009). Similarly, 
global digital surveillance of suspect individuals has become proactive rath-
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er than reactive, and is rapidly reaching a state in which it is being con-
sidered predictive of their real-world actions (Amoore, 2009). Current 
revelations of the massive level of “dataveillance” of individuals, groups, 
organizations, and even nation-states within the infosphere (Newkirk, 
2013; Wood, 2009) may further serve to accelerate this realization of the 
reontologization of reality for others. For those already deeply concerned 
about the commodification of information in contemporary capitalist so-
ciety (for example, Enright, 2011), this can hardly be reassuring. For the 
employees of organizations like Google X, however, the fourth revolution 
is already here and presumably profitable (Stone, 2013).
Floridi’s fourth revolution might easily be added to the list of examples 
in typologies of the so-called information society devised by sociologists, 
such as Feather (2013) and Webster (2002), to organize the variety of em-
pirical efforts at categorizing information “products” that followed Mach-
lup’s pioneering effort (1962). An information society that is subjectively 
defined by its members in the way that Floridi suggests would then fall 
squarely into the subjective, radical change quadrant of Fuchs’s (2013, 
p. 415) typology of information society theories. The information “prod-
ucts” in such a radically reontologized information society would include 
both information objects and information organisms, and the boundar-
ies would appear much more permeable. Even as the Turing test has de-
volved over time into a simple way for machines to distinguish human 
beings from other machines through the use of CAPTCHAs and as Am-
azon’s Mechanical Turk computer program harnesses collective efforts 
by human beings for microtasks unsuitable for computers, for instance, 
there is increasing space for more metaphysical considerations of these 
boundaries.
It is useful to keep in mind that PI is grounded in a metaphysical 
approach, and that conceptual analysis in metaphysics, although both 
connected and committed to our commonsense thinking and scientific 
reasoning about reality (Jackson, 1998), works in a manner that is some-
what different from both. For instance, Nagel’s (1974) classic exploration 
of the open question of the phenomenon of what it would be like to be 
a bat differs in approach from the scientific approach of exploring bat 
biology (Kunz & Parsons, 2009), the social scientific approach of exam-
ining our lay perceptions about bats (Knight, 2008), or the technologi-
cal approach of extending our efforts to conserve bats (Boyles, Cryan, 
McCracken, & Kunz, 2011). 
Similarly, PI offers LIS the unique opportunity to consider the open 
question of the document or the record from the point of view of the 
document or record itself. As Day (2011) has noted in his “Death of the 
User,” the current understanding in LIS of the manifold relationships 
among human beings and information objects is in serious need of revi-
sion. Although it is extraordinarily difficult to guess what it might be to 
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“be” other nonhuman entities with various informational properties, es-
pecially due to our innate tendency to anthropomorphize other entities, 
it is perhaps not beyond our powers to imagine what documents we our-
selves are now or may become in the future. Such an exercise in empathy 
might be the beginnings of an “informational macroethics” turn, which 
could then be extended beyond our selves.
Viewing Turing himself as a representative figure of the very early 
stages of the fourth revolution may help illustrate this issue. The story of 
Turing’s suicide (Hodges, 2012) indicates that the classification of one’s 
“record” within particular sectors of a society’s graphical records can have 
profound personal consequences far different from any other manifesta-
tions of one’s work and survive long after one’s physical death, whether 
that death is of an individual, such as Turing, or a group, such as the 
authors of the clandestine Shabbat Oneg archives in the Warsaw Ghetto 
(Kassow, 2011). 
A better-known example is Anne Frank, arguably the most important 
single voice of the Holocaust (Kluger, 2008, p. x). And yet Frank would 
most likely be as unknown as the other 1.5 million child victims listed in 
the Yad Vashem records had her diary not survived as a document, the 
publication of which has allowed generations after her death to not only 
know of her but to feel that they know her (Spector & Jones, 2007). How-
ever, it is also evident that her document has been appropriated across 
cultures over time in multiple ways that she herself might well find unrec-
ognizable (K. Wilson, 2013). 
Young people leaving their own digital traces today, whether as post-
ings on Facebook or elsewhere in the infosphere, may similarly form part 
of the historical record without realizing that they too are in the process 
of “becoming” a document. The creation and destruction of documents, 
therefore, whether through accidental or deliberate means, becomes a 
matter for more serious contemplation than it has received to date in 
most of LIS, where there is a tendency to focus on matters of retention 
and de-selection on a purely mundane basis of increased efficiencies in 
storage and/or retrieval. Only very recently has the “afterlife” of digital 
documents attracted broader research attention (Bollmer, 2013).
Another celebrated example can be found in research on medical rec- 
ords. It is perhaps not widely appreciated that medical records have been 
more or less tightly connected with librarianship for well over a century 
(Henry, 2011), although usually differentiated and sometimes marginal-
ized as “medical records librarianship.” This relationship developed as 
hospitals became increasingly institutionalized and instrumental in the 
rationalization of what were originally separate records formally and in-
formally kept for various purposes by physicians, nurses, pharmacists, sur-
geons, and the hospital itself (Craig, 1989, 1990). 
The evolution and aggregation of these different records over time 
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into today’s electronic medical record has reemphasized its importance 
in information studies (Siegler, 2010). Medical records have multiple pur-
poses, both administrative and medical, and these have converged over 
time to the extent that Berg and Bowker (1997) can refer to “the multiple 
bodies of the medical record” and claim that these records do not merely 
represent the patients’ bodies but materially rewrite them, incorporating 
them into both the body politic and into bodies of knowledge. 
The commonly used term patient in medical discussions is, of course, 
quite distinct from how it is used in ethical discussions, but Floridi’s “On 
the Intrinsic Value of Information Objects and the Infosphere” (2002b) 
provides an instructive connection between them through viewing a hu-
man being (“Mary”) as a patient at different levels of abstraction in the 
medical-record context. While Mary obviously has rights as a living patient 
in the hospital, including both legal and moral rights, the extent to which 
she also becomes a patient in the medical-records context exemplifies the 
utility that PI could bring to these discussions. 
Floridi notes that Mary has certain, presumably inalienable rights as 
both a living patient and moral “patient” (that is, a patient as the subject 
of agency by another, such as doctors and nurses in the hospital) that do 
not depend on the normal functioning of a human being. For instance, 
an unconscious, comatose, or brain-dead Mary (2002b, p. 294) still enjoys 
these rights as a patient. Floridi states that even after death, her body “still 
enjoys a degree of intrinsic moral worth because of its nature as an infor-
mation object [in this case, pertaining to Mary’s unique identity] and as 
such it can exercise a corresponding claim to moral respect” (p. 296).
He also claims that the moral worth of an informational object like 
Mary has become does not end here: 
This is not a good reason to conclude that, if Mary is reduced to an 
information object . . . [such as] an entry in a database, then this in-
formation object is devoid of any moral value and can be rightly van-
dalised, exploited, degraded, or carelessly manipulated irrespectively 
of any moral concern and constraint . . . an entity x can be respected 
at different LoA, including the level at which x is only an information 
object. (2002b, p. 296) 
Although Mary is a fictional example, Henrietta Lacks (or “HeLa,” as her 
cell line subsequently became known as an important informational ob-
ject in cancer research) is not (Acker, forthcoming; Skoot, 2010), and 
Floridi’s argument here may explain why her case (W. Anderson, 2013) 
resonates so deeply with us. According to Floridi (2002b), PI’s informa-
tion macroethics will allow us
to be able to expand “the everwidening circle of ecological conscious-
ness” . . . and to appreciate what a has in common with p when p is an 
information object, [thus] a should try to transcend a’s own particular 
nature, recognise a’s own minimal status as an information object as 
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well, and then extend the respect—which a would expect any other 
agent to pay to a as an information object—to any other information 
object that may be the patient of a’s actions. All this requires a change in 
ethical sensibility. If over-simplified, the perspective can easily be made 
absurd or ridiculous. Of course, IE does not argue that destroying an 
old copy of a database is a moral crime in itself. This is just too silly. IE 
argues that destroying a unique database can be morally evaluated at 
different levels of abstraction, and that most macroethics work at the 
low level represented by anthropocentric or biocentric interests, and 
are perfectly justified in doing so, but that there is also a higher, more 
minimalist level at which all entities share a lowest common denomi-
nator, their nature as information objects, and that this level too can 
contribute to our ethical understanding. (p. 302)
Were we to accept Floridi’s view of information ethics as encompassing 
informational objects, especially those whose “content genealogy” shows 
clear connections with human lineages, it would deepen the LIS dis-
course substantially, from the present practical focus on maintaining pri-
vacy, maximizing efficiency, and fulfilling legal requirements to viewing 
these documents as informational objects worthy of respect in their own 
right. Other examples particularly worth considering as informational pa-
tients in this regard might be fetal images (Raucher, 2009), photographs 
of unclaimed modern human remains (Kimmerle, Falsetti, & Ross, 2010) 
or cremains (Maisel, 2007), and biobanks and other genetic databases 
(Cordell, 2011). They raise important questions as to when and whether 
informational objects like these begin to acquire moral worth in Floridi’s 
sense sufficient to make their survival beyond the present transcend other 
more pragmatic considerations. Other “embodied” records, such as the 
photographs found at so-called trauma sites like Tuol Sleng in Cambodia 
(Violi, 2012), offer compelling examples. Certainly, burned archives and 
looted libraries also could be considered trauma sites and their contents 
equally worthy of respect and preservation. A similar logic might apply 
to other documents like art and other informational objects of cultural 
heritage (Sax, 1999) or natural heritage (Carmichael, Hubert, Reeves, & 
Schanche, 1994), as well as elsewhere in the infosphere. 
According to Floridi (2002b), PI attempts to draw 
our attention to problems that will become increasingly important the 
more dephysicalised and digitalised our environment becomes. In a 
society that calls itself “the information society” it is vital to develop 
an ethical theory that has the conceptual resources to take into ac-
count the status of information objects. IE is an “architectural” ethics, 
an ethics addressed not only to the users but also to the creators and 
designers of the infosphere. (p. 302)
This IE element of the fourth revolution would mean not only a continu-
ation of the current trend to more collective stewardship of the global cul-
tural heritage but also might lead to a more thoughtful reexamination of 
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documents of all descriptions as providing useful “observables” for this 
endeavor. Floridi has left this question open to LIS investigation. When 
and if the philosophy of library and information studies extends so far 
beyond the concerns of the local collection, it may become no longer ac-
ceptable to remain indifferent to the documented presence of agnotology 
(Proctor, 2008), antiepistemology (Galison, 2004), or apathy (J. Ander-
sen, 2005) elsewhere in the infosphere and consequently make Floridi’s 
concerns even more meaningful to us.
Conclusion
This introductory essay has attempted to provide an accessible guide to 
some of the many apparent possibilities and potential problems for LIS in 
Floridi’s philosophy of information. These seem to suggest that LIS may 
just be as important to PI as PI is to LIS in terms of deepening our mutual 
understanding of information ontologies, the dynamics of informational 
domains, and the variety of evolving relationships among information or-
ganisms and information objects. 
 The reader is urged to consult Floridi’s own works, particularly his 
books (1999b, 2010a, 2011b, 2013a, 2014b), for a much deeper under-
standing of his ideas, which have been only cursorily discussed here, and 
to consider whether PI can indeed offer new energies and synergies to the 
LIS research enterprise, as well as what might be considered a poetic for 
LIS practice:
In the informational fabric that we call Being, there are some spe-
cial nodes. . . . These nodes are informational structures like all other 
nodes, encapsulated packets of differences, relations and processes, 
which contribute to the value and richness of the whole. Their special 
nature lies not in what they are—in their physics and biochemistry, 
to use a different level of abstraction—but in what they can do, for 
they are structuring structures, the ultimate defence against entropy/evil. 
They are the loci where the flow of information reaches its maturity 
and becomes self-conscious, capable of self-determination and able 
to decouple itself from the rest of the fabric and reflecting on its own 
nature and status, thus shifting from a Darwinian, physical evolution 
to a Lamarckian, mental development (we have developed incommen-
surably faster than our bodies). Such nodes, you and I included, have 
an unclear destiny. They might hope that their moral struggle against 
entropy is actually a small episode in a divine plan. If so, this can 
only be reason for rejoicing. Or they might fear that such a struggle 
is unfortunately only a titanic effort in an unrewarding and lonely 
universe, a thin red line against the vandalism of time, whose failure 
can be delayed and mitigated, but not avoided. If so, this should still 
be reason for some modest rejoicing, for they will have helped reality 
to die a more graceful death. Such nodes are the stewards of Being. 
They may do whatever they like, as long as they are careful. (Floridi,  
2010c, pp. 279–280; emphasis in original)
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This, as we may think, seems entirely consistent with a “metaphysics of the 
library.”
Note
 1. Notable contributions to this discussion include: Artandi, 1973; Bade, 2013; Bates, 2005; 
Benediktsson, 1989; Benoît, 2002; Bivens-Tatum, 2006; Brier, 1996; Brothman, 2001, 2002; 
Budd, 2001, 2011, 2013a, 2013b; Buschman, 2003, 2006; Butler, 1952; Capurro, 2009; Cook, 
1984; Cornelius, 1996, 2014; Day, 1996, 2005, 2008a; Dick, 1999, 2002, 2013; Dow, 1977; 
Eastwood, 2002; Fallis, 2008; Fox, 1983; Frohmann 2004a; Furner, 2014; Hansson, 2005; 
Harris, 1986; Hjørland, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2004, 2005; Hoel, 1992; Hofkirchner, 2014; 
Jones, 2005, 2008; Ketelaar, 2001, 2002, 2012; Kolitsch, 1945; Lingard, 2013; Lloyd, 2007; 
Lor, 2014; Madden, 2014; Mai, 2013; Manoff, 2001, 2004; Mukherjee, 1966; Natoli, 1982; 
Neill, 1992; Nesmith, 2002; Nitecki, 1979, 1985; Olson, 1997; O’Toole, 1993; Radford, 1992, 
1998; Rawski, 1973; Rudd, 1983; Shera, 1973; Smiraglia & Van den Heuvel, 2013; Sundin 
& Johannisson, 2005; Talja, Tuominen, & Savolainen, 2005; Thornley, 2012; Trosow, 2001; 
Warner, 2008; P. Wilson, 1983; Wright, 1978; Zins, 2007.
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